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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR:
THE PARADOX OF INTERESTS AND REFORMS

The 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by sweeping, radical neoliberal,
monetarist-inspired economic reforms designed to correct ﬁnancial or structural
crises. Latin American countries initiated the wave, followed by Eastern Europe and
the former USSR, although the timing, scope, and policies varied. Often one reads
accounts of friends and foes of reform lined up to do battle in domestic and
international alliances. However, reform processes and outcomes do not always
follow the formula of reformers versus conservatives; there is more to the balance of
power than these all-too-common accounts would suggest. Industrial managers in
the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia and business elites in Argentina initially
accepted reforms that would soon harm them. Soviet industrial managers, with their
hands on levers of Soviet and early post-Soviet production, did not wholeheartedly
embrace increasingly radical economic reforms, but neither did they reject them, or
prepare for the uncertainty and systemic shocks that marketization would bring.
Unlike younger entrepreneurs, they did not play games of speculation to accumulate
capital; rather, they played on the margins of the law to improve gains and positions
somewhat. However the extent of these practices didn’t come close to guarding them
against what would come. In Argentina, business elites themselves initiated economic
reforms that they thought would bring them the opportunity to participate in
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privatization at low cost, with high gains and increased autonomy from state
regulation. In the end, however, the state picked up the reforms and expanded them,
with the result that business elites faced increased competition that went beyond
short-term challenges to their security.
Why was this so? With the beneﬁt of hindsight, one would advise the Soviet
managers (“Red Directors”) either to ﬁght reforms tooth and nail or prepare
themselves for the onslaught, possibly by playing the speculation game as the
younger generation was beginning to do. One might suggest something similar to
the Argentine businessmen. Yet seldom does this particular type of question emerge;
especially in the former case, Soviet-era managers are often seen as mere rent-seekers
unable or unwilling to adapt and essentially asset-stripping their enterprises to get
rich quickly (e.g. Åslund 2007). This was just as often myth as reality. Using
a comparison of these two groups—Soviet “Red Directors” (industrial managers,
especially in heavy industry, the mainstay of the Soviet economy)1 and Argentine
business elites (business associations representing the interests of various sectors),
we will try to shed light on the processes and dynamics of radical economic change,
in order to draw much-needed attention to the actions of those beneath the state
elite.
THINKING ABOUT CHANGE: ASSUMING DECISION-MAKING

The study of reform contexts in the scholarly literature has tended to focus upon
dependencies of resources, ﬁnance, and legitimacy (Haggard and Kaufman 1995;
Centeno 1994a, 1994b). This follows the current theoretical trend in which the
environment—be it macroeconomic forces, classes, global ﬁnance, states,
organizational ﬁelds, or a combination—leads automatically to organizational
decisions, strategies, and structures. Consider two competing explanations for the
rise of corporate strategies and structures: either the market and ﬁnancial contexts
goad rational utility-maximizing managers and owners to take a particular course of
action; or ﬁelds of power and meanings induce legitimacy-optimizing managers to
adopt new strategies and structures (cf. Chandler 1977; Williamson 1985; Roy 1997;
but see Chandler 1962). Both types of explanation downplay unforeseen outcomes or
the source of decisions ultimately detrimental to the initial interests of those making
the decisions. Put differently, the decision-making process that mediates between
context and outcome is not sufﬁciently accounted for. We suggest that managers
and business elites confronting reform may make decisions that ultimately prove
harmful or even fatal; apparent lukewarm support for seeming reasons of gain turns
out to be a bittersweet embrace of defeat. The story of reform encompasses not only
the politics of implementing and resisting reform, but also the mistakes made by
those who would be directly affected.
1

This paper considers Soviet and early post-Soviet industrial managers, as they were administrative elites for real production (in contrast to state ofﬁcials in the ministries or the Kremlin). We leave out agriculture for reasons of space, although our reading of Barnes 2006 suggests a similar dynamic at work.
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Theory which emphasizes markets (economic arguments) or class and elites
(political economy) tends to assume a rational-actor model of decision-making. In
this assumption, actors evaluate the existing context (in this case, context plus
proposed reforms), calculate present and future costs and beneﬁts, and choose
policies and politicians to support or to obstruct. Reform becomes bargaining
between political and business elites; its outcome depends on a combination of
resources, skill at using them, and contingencies (Haggard 1990; Waterbury 1992). In
the end, the working assumption is that actors calculate what they have, and what
gains or losses different positions might bring, and from there they act. While this
model can shed insights into overt supporters, opponents, winners, and losers, it also
obscures contradictory processes. Furthermore, this model of rationality may not be
entirely correct (cf. Frank 1990), especially given problems of bounded rationality,
decision-making heuristics, and cultural categories and practices through which
actors interpret and act upon perceived environmental “data” (Guillén 1994; Hass
2007; Fligstein 1990). A reliance on rational choice in institutional and structural
contexts oversimpliﬁes how actors come to interpret those very contexts and act
upon them. A particular problem is reading back into decision-making: we see policies
and outcomes, and then we read backward to ﬁgure out just what the initial interests
and opportunities were. An alternative draws on path dependency: actors continue
to reproduce previous actions because of existing institutional and structural
constraints (North 1990; Somers 1998). The problem with path dependency is that it
can explain why change does not occur, but then faces problems when change actually
occurs. Relying on irrational managerial decision-making, or illusory rationality at
the moment of decision-making, can only take us so far. A game-theoretic analysis
would deepen insights; but game theory is better adapted to making policies
themselves (e.g. auctions). In addition, while game theory often adds to context, it
frequently does not contribute anything to the gamers’ heuristics.
One possible direction opens up the decision-making process. In “garbage can
theory” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972), decisions reﬂect inputs from various actors,
negotiated according to internal organizational politics. Considered as the place
where decisions are made, organizations are “intendedly rational” (March and Simon
1958): rather than being based on rational calculation, decisions are the result of
fairly stable behavior and structured roles and tasks (Perrow 1970). Also, within the
limits of the organization, decision-makers routinize certain processes, creating
erroneous interpretative “frameworks” to identify problems and solutions. The rules
and frames become patterned and normalized deviance, producing failures in the
system (Vaughan 1996; Eden 2004). The relevance of this is that frames of reference
of the elites and managers matter. It is a fact that managers and business elites,
when potentially threatened by liberalizing reforms, may in some circumstances
choose to go along with those reforms, succumbing in a way which, while it might
bring short-term gains, may have longer-term dangers. In order to comprehend this
phenomenon more clearly, we turn to the frames through which Soviet managers and
Argentine business elites operated. We compare processes of reacting to marketoriented reforms in Russia and Argentina. Both cases differed along several variables.
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Among others these include: degree of preexisting capitalist structure and practices
(greater in Argentina than in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia); size of the state and
state repressive capacity and thus the potential to enforce radical reform (greater in
the USSR than in Argentina), followed by the degree of state weakness (greater as the
Soviet Union unraveled in the late 1980s); position in the global economy (the USSR
having more freedom of maneuver); and degree of economic militarization and
structural deformation. Despite these differing characteristics for each case, through
the method of contrast we can pinpoint similarities in both countries that account
for similar decision-making by economic elites: namely, that said elites viewed
reforms in a similar fashion, as the best answer for the critical economic situation—
although the notion of “crisis” was different in each case. And in both countries
reforms were not just the result of external pressure, but were supported to varying
degrees by economic elites.
THE MODEL: STOCHASTIC LEARNING, AMBIGUITY, EXPECTED
FAILURE, AND EXPECTED AUTONOMY

These puzzling similarities in how managers and business elites acted, embracing
reforms that ultimately would threaten their very statuses and positions, suggest
that a pure rational-choice approach to decision making, as often employed, will not
work to explain the decision-making process followed by these actors. Neither will
a path-dependent approach, as these economic actors did follow on reforms initially.
We propose that actors followed a stochastic learning model. Actors were rational,
but that rationality was bounded within routinized knowledge and three sets of
perceptions and expectations. Stochastic learning suggests actors anchor decisionmaking in what they know through experience, routines, and categories through
which they ﬁlter knowledge. Three aspects of their perceptions and information add
to our story: ambiguity of reform logics; expectations and assumptions from previous
experiences of reform failure or likely gains; and a narrative of empowerment through
reforms with regard to state economic hegemony, creating an incentive to support
reforms to improve managerial or elite autonomy. These latter two factors involved
interpretations and extrapolations of previous experiences, that is to say, path
dependency. What links these together is how managers’ and elites’ previous
experiences with reforms and state policy-making created knowledge and expectations of how changes would unfold.
KNOWLEDGE, HABITUS, AND STOCHASTIC LEARNING

The rational choice assumption is that actors calculate individual situations fairly
objectively (information costs aside) and assess each fresh situation anew. While they
can learn over time, such learning is primarily the addition of facts or skills; this is
assumed to be straightforward. We take an alternative approach to help explain the
paradoxes we raise above: this combines a Bourdieusian logic of knowledge and habitus
with the “stochastic learning model” (Bush and Mosteller 1955; Macy 1989). First,
experience builds up in “tool kits” of strategies, interpretations, and tactics (Swidler
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1986) that are organized according to relational logics, what Bourdieu calls a habitus
of expectations and strategies (Bourdieu 1990). This alternative has been applied to
organizational structures to explain dynamics and timing of successful and frustrated
change and continuity (cf. Hallett 2003). Organizational and ﬁeld experiences provide
not only knowledge of “the business game” but also expectations and a template for
the construction of strategies for new situations.
This relates to the second half of our alternative, stochastic learning. Perceptions
of what to expect in new contexts, such as proposed economic reforms, are not based
on the strictly rational calculation one often meets in economics and some of the
political science literature. Rather, calculations of future costs and beneﬁts are
shaped by extrapolations from past experiences. These extrapolations are a primary
source of data and experiences for the actors, and they color the categories and
logics which actors employ to make sense of current contexts and possible changes.
This makes seeming irrationalities rational: if past experiences are a result of “bad
sampling,” irrational strategies seem rational to the actor who has sampled badly.
This is related to what Tversky and Kahneman (1974) called “anchoring and
adjustment”: actors take some initial or base estimate (the anchor) about a social
situation and then adjust it as new data come in. Calculations of a present situation
are biased by that initial anchor. If past experiences are stored in “tool kits” and
become part of habitus and stocks of tacit knowledge, contributing to assumptions
about how the world works that we do not question (Nelson and Winter 1982), then
actors’ reactions to present situations are biased by the past, unless the present
situation is clearly demonstrated to be an entirely new challenge.
In sum, rationality is conditioned by heuristics, schemas, and extrapolation from
past experiences, rather than from purely present contexts—the rational actor has
historical baggage, i.e. knowledge gained through experience that actors reasonably
extrapolate. Extrapolation need not be deterministic: reforms that are clear and
backed up by sufﬁciently obvious power (e.g. a ruling party with a sizable electoral
mandate or the means and will to employ violence) might force actors to consider the
possibility that past lessons no longer hold. On the other hand, if articulated changes
are ambiguous and fuzzy, actors are more likely to read the past into the present.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS

Agents react to proposed changes based on what they see and how it relates to
what they have seen. Reforms that are not initially clear or are ambiguously proposed
leave room to read past tendencies into future policies and changes. This is an
important issue that is skirted around by much political economy theory. New
institutional economics does posit “information asymmetries” and “information
costs,” but these assume concrete information to be discovered. Ambiguity suggests
the existence of more noise than discrete data, and that actors interpret that noise.
This makes stochastic learning more problematic: when the content of reform is
unclear or the probability of concrete outcomes is low, actors are more likely to
anchor perceptions and decisions in past events and experiences and extrapolate
into the present and future. Thus, ambiguity further increases the likelihood that
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actors could make a decision that at the moment seems to be in their interests but
which will ultimately be to their detriment (e.g. the lukewarm or partial embracing
of reform, rather than taking greater advantage of it or positive action to resist or
weather it).
Three different sources can be identiﬁed in order to understand ambiguity. First,
reforms were in fact vague and unclear, as political elites proposing reforms might
not be entirely clear of what they wanted or how to get there, or because reforms
develop in a piecemeal, even reactive or seat-of-one’s-pants manner. If political
elites underestimate the degree of reform needed, initial reforms might end up too
conservative, forcing elites to shift the degree or focus of reforms. The second source
of ambiguity was the cacophony from the political elite; the elite did not speak of
reform with the same voice, leaving business elites, managers, and others to guess at
what they should expect. Finally, the third source was inherent in market-oriented
reforms and then more difﬁcult for reformers or managers to avoid: market reforms,
and markets themselves, involve uncertainty about outcomes and even processes of
negotiation and exchange (Centeno 1994b). By providing autonomy, a market
economy makes it difﬁcult to predict with great certainty who will win out in economic
competition. Unless a wide number of variables are controlled by a small number of
organizations, some randomness enters the economic context. Despite attempts to
foresee the future (e.g. through marketing), it is certainly possible for actors to
misjudge demand, lose important customers for various (including non-economic)
reasons or face sudden obstacles (acts of God, labor problems, etc). Liberalizing an
economy involves institutionalizing uncertainty. The urge to anchor and extrapolate
becomes that much greater.
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE

If economic elites expect reforms to fail, they are less likely to take them
seriously or expend time, social capital, and other resources mobilizing to resist or
co-opt them. The crucial question, then, is why these actors would expect failure.
Initial ambiguity is not unimportant, but in itself it is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient.
Two other factors shape expectations of failure. The ﬁrst is past experience with
reforms; the second is perception of the desire, will, and capacity of the political elite
to enact fundamental changes successfully. If the economic elite sees sufﬁcient
continuity in the leadership, and that leadership has a history of imperfect reform, it
is not irrational for it to expect continued failure. Experiences of previous attempts
at and failures of reform increase the likelihood that managers and business elites
will not see reforms as potential challenges. This holds true unless there is a clear
and powerful initial signal that a reform leadership and its context are sufﬁciently
different from past contexts that “conventional wisdom” will not hold true. If
managers and business elites expect failure, then it will not be rational to invest in
adjusting to possible changes resulting from reforms: either they can maneuver and
make marginal gains, or they will be forced to resume the status quo after inevitable
failure. As a result, actors are not ready to confront challenges if fundamental change
does result.
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Expectations of failure might come from several sources: from inﬁghting at the
top, in which case reforms are scuttled or delivered in a confusing condition (we will
return to the related issue of ambiguity); from the impossibility of implementation
due to contradiction with other existing core aspects of economic institutions and
structures; or from resistance by managers, business elites, and other functionaries
themselves. If such managers and business elites are engaged in passive resistance,
they might expect reforms to fail, thus reducing perceived incentives to take fuller
advantage of reforms, in order to brace themselves for greater future shocks, or to
increase resistance.
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY FOR AUTONOMY

The discussion thus far suggests overwhelming incentives to do nothing in the
face of perceived ambiguity and expectations of failure. However, there might be
incentives to embrace such changes despite these negative perceptions. If an
arrangement of economic structures and state power constrains economic actors,
then reforms that initially (even ambiguously) suggest improved autonomy is likely
to be embraced to some degree. In this respect the logic of neoliberal-style reforms
creates a dangerous illusion: by potentially promising autonomy, initial stages of
market or pseudo-market reforms did provide most elites with early gains resulting
not from economic advantages but from the initial possibility of taking advantage of
opportunities in deﬁcit economies (e.g. by raising prices or increasing output). This
contributed to the illusion of market reforms as inherently positive, even if doomed
to fail. The experience of the Soviet managers was that the planned economy was
inefﬁcient, and managers did not particularly like having to deal with state ministries
to alter Plan targets or to obtain deﬁcit materials (which they did through the shadow
economy as much as through formal supply). In the Argentine case the crisis of the
state is key to explaining business strategies: business noticed that the state would
not be able to continue subsidizing local investments in a context where external
debt imposed great pressure on ﬁscal resources. Under these circumstances, the
reforms, especially the privatization of public enterprises, were seen as an opportunity
for making new and more lucrative business.
This point is critical to our analysis. So far, the stimulus is for managers and
business elites to do little when faced with unclear reforms which they believe to be
doomed to failure. Neoliberal reforms that clearly might promise competition and
market exit, backed by a regime with the will and power to enforce changes, might
lead to resistance. Unclear reforms that ultimately might fail, but that also promise
some degree of autonomy, prompt agents to go along with reforms that ultimately
might hurt them. How, in this hypothesis, would such reforms be to their detriment?
The answer is that such damage occurs if, by focusing on smaller gains in autonomy,
such managers and business elites neglect to set up defensive or offensive strategies
to guard or expand their positions in case of increasingly radical reform. Put
differently, these managers will be harmed by the fact that, rather than using reforms
to enhance their ability to accumulate proﬁt and reinvest it for further accumulation
(the driving logic of capitalism according to Marx and Weber), they have used the
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opportunity not only to gain quick proﬁt via asset-stripping or playing on the margins
of law—this is the usual story one hears in discussions, the media, and even
scholarship (e.g. Kotkin 2001)—but also to increase autonomy. Rather than taking
risks, engaging with reform and even pushing it further (as other elites, for example
ﬁnancial elites and “oligarchs” in post-Soviet Russia, might be expected to do), these
managers will suffer from focusing on gaining ground for themselves in the
expectation that when the reforms fail, they will have gained a foothold of additional
decision-making authority.
TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY? SOVIET MANAGERS,
ARGENTINE BUSINESS, AND REFORMS

Import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and increasing external debt led
Argentina to a seemingly inextricable economic muddle by the 1980s. The Soviet
economy was faced with difﬁculties from out-of-date technology, expenses incurred
in foreign policies, and a growing dependence on petrodollar income; by the 1980s
the Soviet leadership as well faced growing problems with economic regeneration
alongside American rearmament. Economic tribulations in Argentina and the Soviet
Union, from debts and decreasing petrodollars, but also from increasingly rigid statecentered economic structures, made the perpetuation of the status quo difﬁcult. This
forced political and economic elites to recognize the potential necessity for
something more than marginal reform. Emerging factions of reformers within the
regime and state, and within think tanks and other bodies contributing to internal
(even hidden) discourses, increased the likelihood of at least an attempt at
fundamental change.
MARKET REFORM FOR THE UNINITIATED: THE SOVIET CASE

As a detailed discussion of Red Directors’ initial conditions and various decisions
made over this period would make this article unwieldy, we present only a brief
overview. Two obvious questions are whether Red Directors had real choices and
whether they were really at risk from increasingly radical reform. As to the ﬁrst, the
power of the ministries to compel managers to act as the state wanted was problematic
to begin with. Brezhnev’s political compromise with managers and various levels of
state bureaucrats (Bunce 1983; Millar 1985) might not have provided the kind of
autonomy managers might have in a capitalist system (even where managers are not
owners). However, it did provide a social contract of sorts, in which managers (like
other state functionaries) followed the general Party line and did not resist authority
above them, and were rewarded with relative security in their positions. Industrial
managers did have to orient decisions and behavior to the Five-Year Plan and monthly
plans, but they were not punished with bankruptcy (as in capitalism) or coercion (as
under Stalin). Red Directors could play games of informal or passive resistance, footdragging over Plan fulﬁllment or supply and utilizing informal networks to pressure
higher-up elites in the ministries and the Kremlin to water down various reforms, as
happened in the 1960s and 1970s (Arnot 1988; Åslund 1989; Nove 1977). By the
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Gorbachev era, state power was beginning to crumble from reduced surveillance and
accountability of ofﬁcials, and then from “bank runs” on state resources (Solnick
1998). Managers did not have a totally free hand to do what they wanted. They still
had to play a complicated pricing game involving semi-independent daughter ﬁrms
and commodities exchanges (the birzha) to ﬁnd private partners, as we explore more
fully below. Further, managers had to offer employees the chance to vote on enterprise
reforms, including turning shop ﬂoors into semi-independent smaller ﬁrms or leased
ﬁrms (cf. Hass 1998: chapter 4). In addition, Red Directors were not property owners;
they still answered to the state, even if state representatives or local ofﬁcials were
silent partners.
Did Red Directors face a real threat from fundamental economic reform? Even at
that time, optimistic as they might be, industrial managers had evidence that
fundamental reform would create serious problems. After 1989 and the loss of captive
clients in Eastern Europe, Red Directors in electronics, metallurgy and the like faced
reduced exchange and export—and if state subsidies were to decline, this would
pose an ominous problem. The replacement of the rigid Five-Year Plan with its secure
state subsidies wth the system of goszakazy (subsidies and planning through concrete
state purchase orders) increased uncertainty vis-à-vis needed output and likely
income.2 While many Red Directors articulated (ill-founded) optimism about the
competitiveness of their goods (cf. Hass 2005), travels abroad or initial imported
consumer goods should have convinced them of their weak position. Even in 1995,
two electronics ﬁrms in Saint Petersburg continued to express pride in their output
(VCRs, telephones and the like) despite clear inferiority to Western competitors.3
A competitive market, reduced state support, and an emerging reformist movement
inside and outside the Communist Party should have been clear signals that Red
Directors were potentially vulnerable.
What is interesting, therefore, about the Soviet managers is that the predicament
in which they ultimately found themselves was due to their having taken a middle-ofthe-road approach to reform. In the late 1980s, while younger engineers or Komsomol
activists were setting up small independent cooperatives to speculate using deﬁcit
goods—and reinvesting proﬁts into further speculation or small-scale production of
various goods and services (cf. Gustafson 1999; Listovskaia 1994)—Red Directors were
playing a muted speculative game for a small proﬁt, which they then failed to reinvest
to improve gains or prepare themselves for shocks. Red Directors set up small
independent ﬁrms to milk state-owned enterprises, but if the mother enterprise
2

For a detailed recounting of these problems for one industrial ﬁrm, see Leningradskii
stankostroitel’, January 20, 1993:1. Leningradskii stankostroitel’ was the enterprise newspaper
for the Sverdlov machine-tool enterprise. Considering that its journalists were fairly open in
reporting worker discontent with and harsh criticisms of management, it is doubtful that
enterprise journalists would lie about ﬁnances.

3

This is from Hass’ interviews (Saint Petersburg 1995) with the general director and sales director of one electronics ﬁrm, and with assistant directors of sales and marketing at another.
Enterprise newspapers at both ﬁrms continued to claim their electronics output was as good
as imports (cf. Hass 2005 for detail).
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collapsed, they had no fallback position. Consider the use of the birzha (Soviet stock
exchange). A state-owned enterprise or its daughter would bring materials to the
birzha, originally obtained at low state-set prices, and exchange them for other goods
or sell them to private cooperatives or semi-independent daughters of other enterprises
at higher “market” (negotiated) prices. This provided some proﬁt, but Red Directors
stuck with these basic tactics to generate wealth, not to increase value or to increase
accumulation of wealth. They did not set up stout defenses against reforms even as
time went on; the best they usually did was to support lobbying groups and parties
(e.g. Arkadii Vol’skii’s Civic Union) or play a dangerous game of chicken with the state,
running up debts and delaying restructuring in hopes that the state would rescue them
to avoid massive unemployment (Dolgopiatova 1995).
While managers in charge of natural resource extracting enterprises had goods
with more demand outside Russia, managers of enterprises in heavy industry,
machine-tool production, electronics, textiles and the like had far fewer real assets
to strip. Technology was old, materials were needed for either production or barter,
and managers needed to provide their employees with something if they could not
pay wages. Many of these “Red Directors” ended up in the precarious situation of
value-destruction and the need to participate in the barter economy to survive
(Gaddy and Ickes 2002). If a few managers could strip assets to increase wealth
temporarily, many more found themselves and their enterprises in trouble; eventual
insider privatization there may have been, but the wealth stolen in the process may
be as much myth as reality.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS AND UNCLEAR FUTURES

In hindsight, it appears inevitable that Soviet economic reform would be
ambiguous. Gorbachev’s own policy desires changed over time, from marginal change,
to increasingly radical change, to a last-minute stepping back, especially as Boris
Yeltsin’s star rose higher, legitimating increasing radicalization of political and
economic reforms. Gorbachev’s Kremlin administration was split over what kinds of
reforms were necessary (with Gorbachev wavering between camps). The initial
Gorbachev-Ligachev duumvirate created increasing tensions over the direction of
reform, with Gorbachev favoring faster reforms and of greater depth than the more
conservative Ligachev. But after Ligachev was essentially sidelined in 1988, Boris
Yeltsin began his drive for power. This increased the cacophony at the top, leaving
Red Directors confused and liberated: it was unclear which faction would eventually
win out, and the legal confusion gave them de facto autonomy to run enterprises as
they saw ﬁt. Finally, market economies have a degree of in-built ambiguity and
uncertainty; creating a market where it essentially had not existed—had in fact
been anathema—meant accepting this ambiguity and uncertainty as a core feature
of the new economy.
In the Soviet Union, the piecemeal style of reforms, from granting more autonomy
to enterprises in 1988 to liberalization and shock therapy in 1992, meant there was no
single package with a clear logic of unfolding or deﬁnite end result that Red Director
managers could interpret or resist strongly. Industrial managers could engage
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marginally (not always proactively), until the economy began to unravel and radical
liberalizing reforms appeared the only way out. Given that Gorbachev’s own ideas on
policy shifted as initial, cautious reforms went nowhere, and bearing in mind the battles
he had to ﬁght in order to overcome opposition within the higher ranks of the Party and
state bureaucracy to anything beyond cosmetic reforms, this is no surprise. When
Mikhail Gorbachev set out to improve the Soviet economy, he picked up Iurii Andropov’s
reforms to improve labor discipline. This included crackdowns on labor shirking (e.g.
raiding movie theaters during the day and checking people’s labor books to make sure
they were not supposed to be at work) and destroying vineyards or reducing vodka
output to address alcoholism. Gorbachev also introduced khozraschët, enterprise costaccounting, and legalized cooperatives within tight restrictions. Both of these minor
reforms brought little change. As the Soviet economy continued to worsen and
democratic reforms began to take root in the form of media openness or glasnost’ and
later in semi-contested elections to the Supreme Soviet, discussions of reforms
expanded. Gorbachev’s next set of reforms involved giving more decision-making
autonomy to enterprises, the most important policy being the 1987 law “On Enterprise.”
Goods and commodity exchanges (birzha) were legalized so that managers could
formally exchange goods—the hope being that this would reduce supply bottlenecks
that continuously plagued the Soviet economy. Five-year and monthly plan targets
were replaced by goszakazy, state purchases. Finally, managers gained more decisionmaking autonomy to restructure their own enterprises, e.g. turning shop ﬂoors into
ﬁnancially independent daughter ﬁrms (cf. Hass 1999).
If anything, managers had been turning toward Gorbachev’s style of reforms,
which positioned a weakening state, vulnerable to being taken advantage of by
Soviet enterprises, at the center of the economy (cf. Burawoy and Krotov 1992).
Several tactics made it fairly clear that managers were taking advantage not only of
what reforms offered, but also of the ambiguity inherent in those reforms. One clear
example is how industrial managers often (but not always) used the birzha. The
original intent of birzha reform was to reduce supply bottlenecks, the thorn of the
command economy, by allowing managers to come together and exchange needed
goods without state interference or bureaucratic obfuscation. And in fact some
participants did use the birzha in this way. One group of entrepreneurs interviewed
by one of the authors in Russia in 1995 worked at one commodities birzha, exchanging
timber products for ﬁrms that needed to unload or obtain such goods. However, state
law did not stop managers from using the birzha in other ways: here the ambiguity of
reforms affected how managers (rationally) behaved. One tactic was to use the birzha
to trade goods obtained cheaply from the state and sell them at higher prices, and
then pocket some of the gain personally (Sokolin 1997; Kotkin 2001). In this way,
inherent ambiguities in reforms led industrial managers to perceive a moment at
which they could gain. Thus they accepted reforms and participated in them, without
expecting that the reforms would become more radical. These ambiguities did not
alarm managers until it was too late. Certainly some actions in the birzha or
cooperatives produced value; enterprise newspapers in Saint Petersburg from this
period are full of accounts of cooperatives producing consumer goods or providing
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industrial services that were needed but difﬁcult to obtain. But the ambiguity of
reforms meant that industrial managers could play on the margins of the rules and
intended reforms—as it was not clear just what, speciﬁcally, Gorbachev and his
government intended anyway, or how long they would remain in power as political
tension began to rise. Too late, these Soviet industrial managers began to understand
the quandary they would face as 1991 came to a close and as shock therapy took
effect in 1992. Several Petersburg factory newspapers featured employees’ and
managers’ worries on the eve of 1992: the previous year had seen the economy and
polity fragment, and the promised radical reforms by Yeltsin and company now
aroused trepidation, where earlier Gorbachev-style socialist liberalization from the
Plan and ministries had brought relief. Initially managers embraced liberalization,
for it meant dealing directly with purchasers and setting their own agenda for output,
pricing, and whom to do business with. However, these post-Soviet managers soon
learned that this freedom applied to others as well; by losing the control of the Plan,
they had also lost its security, as traditional purchasers decided to go elsewhere or
stopped buying altogether.4
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE

The upshot of the stochastic learning model for this concrete case is that if Soviet
managers expected failure, they would not take seriously possible threats that market
reforms, in theory, would present—because they had not seen the “theory,” only past
practices. Future oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii noted this when Gorbachev’s reforms
began to unfold. Khodorkovskii himself saw the opportunity to use liberalized exchange,
rubles and hard currency rights from the Komsomol (Party youth organization), yet the
manager of the research institute where Khodorkovskii worked would not make use of
entrepreneurial opportunities to make proﬁt himself, even though he supported
Khodorkovskii. His rationale: he had seen reforms come and go, and so was hesitant to
invest personal effort and organizational resources into semi-legal ventures that might
become illegal before long (Hoffman 2002:107). It is hard to fault Soviet managers for
such skepticism. While Mikhail Gorbachev’s image was that of a younger, more dynamic
leader, in contrast to the geriatric conservative wing of the Soviet Communist leadership,
he nonetheless shared collective leadership with conservatives; in addition, there was
a history of younger new leaders (Khrushchev or Kosygin) not living up to reform hopes.
Khrushchev’s economic restructuring was ultimately reversed after it created resistance
within the Party and state bureaucracy (Nove 1972). The Liberman reforms of the 1960s,
championed by Aleksei Kosygin, promised to alter the workings of the Plan, by focusing
on actual use value added to production, i.e. a measure of pseudo-proﬁt from actual
use and demand of output. While not “market” in the usual sense, the Liberman reforms

4

For survey data from managers on this issue, see Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii barometr, issues
4/1992 and 2/1993. Managers were disturbed that when all managers received market freedom to buy and sell, this also meant that others could reject their output—leaving all worse
off than under the Plan, when at least output was shipped off and paid for.
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promised both opportunity and discipline. However, these reforms tailed off once their
champion in the Kremlin, Kosygin, lost the competition for power to Leonid Brezhnev.
One other attempt at reform, the reforms pioneered at the Shchëkino Chemical Combine,
promised more autonomy in how enterprises could use their wage funds, allowing them
to keep some proﬁts from efﬁciency gains. The experiment continued through the
1970s, but it too faced obstacles from state bureaucrats and from managers of
enterprises not involved in the experiment, who possibly felt threatened by improved
efﬁciency at the Shchëkino Combine and other participating enterprises. Like the
earlier reforms, this one too stalled (Arnot 1988). Even discussions of reforms in the
late Brezhnev era may have added more Plan indicators for managers to account for and
for Plan bureaucrats to work with—but these ultimately brought little real change to
the economy (Åslund 1989).
The upshot: support for unclear reform was possible because it was based on vague
and abstract proposals, and upon the expectation, extrapolated rationally from past
experiences, that there would ultimately be no fundamental change. Managers believed
they would not be exposed to market competition and discipline, or the kinds of initial
sales and ﬁnancial shocks usually associated with the ﬁrst phase of radical liberalization
and privatization. In fact, some analysts claimed managers still expected reforms to
fail in that ﬁrst watershed year of 1992. Red Directors reacted to initial hard-budget
policy by continuing to put in purchase orders and produce outputs despite problems
of payments and rising debts. Skyrocketing inter-enterprise debt (Ickes and Ryterman
1992) threatened to bring the suffering Russian economy to a standstill, and on this
“game of chicken” interpretation, managers would force market reformers to go back to
the soft budgets of the anti-market Soviet system (Dolgopiatova 1994). Even after
1992, such expectations persisted. In her study of Red Directors in the early years of
post-Soviet change, Belianova (1995) found that Red Directors’ attitude toward the
economic crisis shaped their own reforming strategies vis-à-vis their home enterprises.
Optimistic managers, who believed reforms might actually reduce the crisis before long,
were more likely to follow the intention of those reforms and introduce relatively more
encompassing changes in organizational structure and product output. Those Red
Directors more pessimistic about the success of reforms and the end of the crisis were
more likely to play it safe and maintain the structures and product mixes that the
Soviet era had bequeathed them.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUTONOMY

While Soviet managers had little faith in ultimate fundamental reform and were
less willing than younger employees and Komsomol activists to pursue entrepreneurial
activity—even if potentially lucrative and involving speculation for proﬁt—they were
nevertheless able to see reforms as an opportunity to gain and, hopefully, hold on to
some autonomy. There were two sides to this desire for autonomy. The ﬁrst was that
managers were agents for the state and were subject to detailed Plan targets and
procedures. Secondly, many managers realized that the Plan-based economy was
inefﬁcient, and saw that market-based reforms, even if ultimately watered down, could
free them from the seeming paradox of producing goods whose use they questioned
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and whose users often they did not know.5 Thus, the possibility of market-like reform
brought the chance for formal autonomy vis-à-vis the Plan. Interestingly, this dovetailed
with the informal logic of the Brezhnevite Soviet economy and the “little deal.”
Members of the Party and state bureaucracy, including managers, had some informal
autonomy in return for not rocking the boat of the Brezhnev regime (Millar 1985; Bunce
1983). Brezhnev’s “little deal” should not be interpreted as managerial license, but
rather as an informal incentive not to challenge the supremacy of the regime. This is
indicative of the fact that, as noted earlier, managers did realize the inefﬁciencies and
even irrationalities of the Soviet economy.
Past experiences (cf. Breslauer 1982; Katz 1972) suggested that reform would
fail, but that managers might be able to take some advantage for quick and marginal
autonomy. Gorbachev’s reforms of enterprise authority, the legalization (within
limits) of the cooperative, and the later legalization of the birzha were a demonstration
that, even if this set of reforms were to fail, managers had an opportunity not seen in
the 1960s and 1970s for autonomy which implied gains for them; even if the clock
turned back on such autonomy, it seemed that managers would at least have
temporary beneﬁts. Red Directors’ tactics suggest that they took advantage of
autonomy, supporting this aspect of reforms only insofar as it did not threaten their
security, a danger which they did not suspect in the late 1980s, as Gorbachev’s reforms
evolved. The “On Enterprise” reform and a host of smaller decrees made it possible
for Red Directors to open cooperatives or transform shop ﬂoors into semi-independent
small or leased ﬁrms; these groups had the opportunity to produce beyond the Plan
and goszakazy for proﬁt (often for other cooperatives and small ﬁrms). A case in
point was Leningrad’s (Saint Petersburg’s) Leningrad Metal Factory: a cautious
introduction of autonomy to cooperatives was rescinded; instead, the enterprise’s
managers turned some shop ﬂoors into “small ﬁrms” (malye predpriiatiia) under
managerial control.6 The use of the birzha to obtain needed deﬁcit materials as well
as to improve proﬁt for cooperatives and managers has been discussed. This was an
exercise in new-found managerial autonomy gained by playing the margins of
legality. Another example of managers grasping autonomy was voluntary associations.
These were groups of ﬁrms in related production and often from the same ministry or
local-level glavk (regional equivalent of a ministry). After the end of the Plan
structure and the introduction of goszakazy, supply bottlenecks and ﬁnancing became
worse. To support their enterprises ﬁnancially and materially, and thus to support
their own positions, Red Directors often engaged suppliers and partners directly,

5

This comes from interviews Hass conducted at twenty Petersburg electronics and industrial
enterprises in 1994–95. All mentioned Plan irrationalities, and the fact that reforms freed
them from producing output that often had no real value other than legitimating the Plan.
(They were all also critical of Yeltsin for reducing state subsidies and introducing problematic or unjust privatization, and they were critical of younger entrepreneurs for becoming
wealthy via “speculation” rather than by adding value productively.)

6

The history comes from accounts and interviews published in the Leningrad Metal Factory
enterprise newspaper Turbostroitel’ in 1989–1992.
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rather than through the medium of the ministries.7 This provided several advantages
to managers vis-à-vis autonomy. Red Directors were now dealing directly with supply
partners, not through the state. By the 1990s, younger experts at these voluntary
associations would organize lobbying efforts and analyze strategies for improving
sales and seeking ﬁnance. For example, a Petersburg voluntary association for major
bread ﬁrms helped those member ﬁrms coordinate supply for production and mediate
disputes; in the early 1990s the association hired newly-trained experts in ﬁnance or
with experience in supply and exchange to organize privatization plans and to begin
marketing projects.8
Voluntary associations did help member ﬁrms survive, but they also allowed
member managers to hold the illusion that they could weather the storm and emerge
safe and healthy within a few years. Some associations created pocket banks—banks
created with association money and attracting deposits by citizens and private ﬁrms.
However, by 1993 some pocket banks were having trouble supporting their associations
or were demanding higher interest rates for loans to their very founders.9 Further,
these associations kept member managers locked into their previous production,
which often became value-destroying, especially for heavy machinery and electronics.
The voluntary associations, which initially cemented newly-gained autonomy from
direct state control, trapped managers into producing old goods for each other.
Contrast this with younger ﬁnancial elites and oligarchs in the early 1990s. These
ﬁnancial entrepreneurs made fortunes speculating with deﬁcit goods or in currency;
unlike Red Directors, they took full advantage of liberalization to trade in whatever
they could, reinvesting some of their proﬁts into further exchange or even production.
Their empires were increasingly diversiﬁed, reﬂecting a logic not of grabbing some
initial autonomy and defending it ﬁercely, but of taking advantage of changes and
investing wherever money might be made (cf. Starodubrovskaia 1995; Pappe et al.
1997; Gorbatova 1995; Prokop 1995). In contrast to Red Directors, these younger
entrepreneurs proactively engaged reforms.
We do not want to suggest that Soviet industrial managers were ecstatic about
the possibility of market-style reforms of any shade. Confronted with a context in
which they had to generate their own sources of income as state subsidies dried up
or “disappeared,” managers discovered they did not always have the necessary human
capital or practices to adjust (Hass 2005). However, they had embraced possibilities
for autonomy in the birzha and enterprise reform. Paradoxically, this occurred through
no organized resistance; they participated in carrying out Gorbachev’s reforms,
taking autonomy but resisting accountability—a practice that continued into the
7

Managers at electronics and lathe-making ﬁrms in Saint Petersburg (interviewed by Hass in
1995) noted that they often knew whom they were supplying or being supplied by.

8

These data came from Hass’s interviews with bread enterprise managers and the head of marketing for the Petersburg association of bread-makers.

9

To use the example of the Sverdlov machine-tool enterprise: managers here helped create
pocket banks to help them survive initial ﬁnancial turbulence. But before long, the pocket
bank was demanding higher interest rates (Leningradskii stankostroitel’, September 9, 1992:1,
and July 13, 1993:1).
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1990s, as managers used networks and barter to avoid bankruptcy and keep their
value-destroying enterprises alive (Gaddy and Ickes 2002).10 In other words, they
moved forward on aspects of reform that would ultimately haunt them.
BUSINESS ELITES DIG THEIR OWN GRAVE:
THE CASE OF ARGENTINA

The rationale of the process in which Argentine business elites were engaged was
different, in many ways, from the one faced by Soviet managers in the same period.
Firstly and most obviously, Soviet reforms ended in the creation of a market economy
after decades of the socialist experience; the creation of new institutions, economic
rules, and actors was the result of the transformation we analyze here. In Argentina,
change was relatively limited: the move was from a state-oriented strategy of
development based on an internal market protected by high tariff barriers, to a more
open economy with, at least in theory, a reduced level of state intervention. 11 Secondly,
the actors of the drama were conceptually different: the key actors in Argentina were
not managers of state-owned enterprises but real capitalists, businessmen who had
internalized the rules and logic of the capitalist market. They had, then, a different
relation with the state and with the market, and they made their projections about the
consequences of the reforms on a different basis. Finally, partly as a result of their
different historical development, Argentine businessmen played a more active role
than Soviet managers in the process of reforms. In fact, through their business
associations, this group was one of the main promoters of the transformation. In sum,
the Soviet and Argentine experiences differed in terms of the position of business
within the two economies, as well as in the political dynamics at play. Yet paradoxically,
the same basic forces and processes were at work in the USSR and in Argentina. Like
Soviet managers, Argentine business elites were oriented toward rules and frameworks
to anchor decision-making: elucidating these provides clues as to why they agreed
with and initially even pushed market-oriented policies.
Argentine business support of the reforms holds another paradox: the most
prominent local businessmen had developed under conditions of state protection.
10

This leads to a Prisoners’ Dilemma moment: autonomy without accountability threatens such
behavior as asset-stripping or rent-seeking and allows the continuation of value-destroying
practices or incompetences. All this can lead to greater economic losses or inefﬁciencies, deepening crisis, and the increasing probability that reforms would become yet more radical.

11

As the aim here was to analyze the political actions of a business through the positions
adopted by its associations in public space, our data mainly comes from archival research. We
considered the “ofﬁcial” publications of the business associations (such as annual reports,
journals, and speeches) as indicators of the strategic positions adopted by each of them in
the political ﬁeld. We also took into account the positions adopted by the chairmen of the
associations in the press, in order to capture discrepancies and tensions within the organizations. Archival research in newspapers also provided us with a description and characterization of the concrete political actions followed by the business—from block-outs to meetings
with government ofﬁcials. Finally, we considered debates and positions expressed in the specialized press (such as the journals Mercado and Apertura) as a gateway to communication
strategies developed within the ﬁeld.
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Even more strikingly, during the 1970s the military government had tried out a series
of “liberal” policies—similar to those introduced in the 1990s—that had damaged
important fractions of business. Thus, by the beginning of the 1980s, when the new
democratic government arrived in power, these fractions were far from supportive of,
let alone demanding, market reforms. 12 In 1981, the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA)
argued that
whereas it was previously believed that everything can be solved by the market
alone, we have discovered that the process of purifying and strengthening the
productive system has resulted in a situation in which many efﬁcient ﬁrms are
dying or have already died (UIA 1981).

The positions of the industrialists were not theoretical: due to new levels of
competition and lack of credit, many of them had faced bankruptcy in the previous
years. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, most fractions of Argentine business
had adopted a shared diagnosis: even those affected by the opening of the economy
during the 1970s agreed to demand market reforms.13
How can this change in business positions be explained? Political dynamics,
government strategies, ideological frameworks, and type of business organization
are all factors that help to understand this shift (Beltrán 2007). The last of these
reasons is also key to understanding the business conﬁguration in Argentina which,
in fact, displayed a much more complex spectrum than the Soviet one. Generally,
the ﬁeld of Argentine business was characterized by diversity and heterogeneity
among its members. Differences concerned size, sector of activity, target markets,
type of production (diversiﬁed or specialized), as well as cultural traditions and
political resources (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997; Viguera 2000). All these differences
helped create diverse preferences and were the basis of the different logics of
political action followed by each fraction. Diversity can be seen even within the
aggregates we are considering here, i.e. the business associations. In fact, the
existence of an extended number of associations is a strong indicator of the level
of heterogeneity of their interests.14 Business heterogeneity had been crucial to the
12

During the 1970s, the military government propelled a series of neoliberal economic reforms,
e.g. opening the economy and deregulating the ﬁnancial system. These brought more harm
than good. As a result, when the new democratic government arrived in 1984, many business
elites (especially in manufacturing) were critical of liberal theory.

13

While some were critical, traditionally liberal business associations, e.g. the Argentine Rural Society and Argentine Chambers of Commerce, insisted that the liberal model had not
been exhausted, and all trouble came from state intervention. These arguments assume
that the critical situation of the early 1980s was due not to a failure of liberalism but to
a return of the old model. Liberalism—or neoliberalism—was plausible as a “new,” untried
alternative.

14

The main business organizations (excluding sectoral and regional ones) are: the Argentine
Industrial Union (founded in 1887), the General Confederation of Industry (1951), the Argentine Industry Council (1982), the Argentine Rural Society (1866), the Argentine Agrarian Federation (1912), the Argentine Rural Confederation (1942), the Agricultural Inter-Cooperative
Confederation (1956), the Argentine Chamber of Construction (1936), the Argentine Union of
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political dynamics of the country during the second half of the 20th century, as
some scholars have suggested (Portantiero 1977, Rouquié 1982).Therefore, by the
end of the 1980s, what was new in the Argentine political scenario was that all
business sectors, in spite of their historical differences, agreed on the same project:
the transformation of the state.
AMBIGUOUS REFORMS AND UNCLEAR FUTURES

As in the USSR, vagueness and ambiguity played a critical role in the adoption
and support of Argentine market reforms, although ambiguity had a different
meaning in each case. In contrast to Soviet managers, Argentine business leaders
considered the opening of the economy not as a completely new phenomenon but
as something that had been tried in the past decade. Ambiguity was not connected,
then, to the unfamiliarity of the market as a form of social organization, nor to the
policies required to create these unknown markets quickly. Instead, ambiguity
arose from a combination of factors, including the fragmentation of the business
ﬁeld and the vagueness of the liberal reform proposals. Out of this process, the
business ﬁeld emerged in a unique position, promoting and legitimizing the reforms
introduced during the 1990s. This common position made sense, however, in a
context where different factors came together.
In the ﬁrst place, liberal positions were part of an old tradition within the
business ﬁeld. In fact, some of the most powerful fractions had historically been
identiﬁed with economic liberalism. Among these fractions were some powerful
exporters, members of the banking system, and the inﬂuential rural sector, grouped
in the Sociedad Rural Argentina. For them, state intervention had led to cyclical
economic crises and had isolated the country from the rest of the world. Over the
three previous decades, their interests had clashed with populist-oriented policies
from democratic governments, and they had therefore supported coups d’état and
military regimes (Rouquié 1982; O’Donnell 1973).15 Although they had a critical view
of state intervention, they had obtained gains from their close connections with the
government and believed that bargaining and confrontation with the state were key
to constructing repertoires of political action (Tilly 1995).
Construction (1985), the Argentine Chamber of Commerce (1924), the Argentine Commerce
Union (1981), the Association of Banks of the Argentine Republic (1919), the Argentine Banks
Association (1972), the General Economic Confederation (1953), and the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange (1854).
15

In Latin America, Keynesianism acquired two forms: developmentalism and national populism.
Developmentalists argued that the primary goal was production and growth, not income redistribution. Their solution involved intense vertical import-substituting industrialization,
focusing on a high-priority basic industrial sector; rapid capital accumulation emphasizing
foreign investment; and state involvement to channel private initiatives. National populism
favored domestic industry over foreign industry. The preference for national capital reinforced the emphasis on small-scale industry. This camp also advocated greater state involvement in production. Inherited from the ﬁrst Peronist party, national populism was highly
inﬂuential in Argentina during the second half of the 20th century (see Sikkink 1991).
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The political strategy of Alfonsín’s government (1984-89) was also critical in
deﬁning the positions of business during this decade. As the government believed
that political dynamics were more important than the economy, Alfonsín sought to
create an isolated state bureaucracy, trying to put some distance between the state
and both business and trade unions (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997; Botto 1999; Schvarzer
and Sidicaro 1987). From the business perspective, this initial distance set the state
up as the political adversary of capital (Schmitt 1999). Besides that, the government
not only opposed liberal economic ideas but also reinforced state intervention, in
particular by controlling prices in order to get inﬂation under control. Thus, the
government played a game of opposition to business that alienated most business
associations.16 As early as 1985, the industrialists and the ruralists agreed on deﬁning
the state as “oppressive,” arguing that reality had shown that “only private capitalism
can set the direction of the political economy” (El bimestre político y económico
17/1984). Business became even more critical insofar as the economic crisis spiraled
out of state control by the end of the decade, most visibly demonstrated by declining
GDP and rising foreign debt, which made up 20 percent of GDP by the end of the
military regime, and by high levels of inﬂation (Madisson 1989; INDEC 1986). This
situation, and the identiﬁcation of the crisis with state intervention, convinced even
businesses previously critical of liberalism that the state had to be reformed.
Consensus also arose as a result of the political dynamics. As business elites
confronted the state, their agreement on key issues contributed to coordinating
actions in spite of diversity of interests. Most of the business sector saw the possibility
of coordinated actions as the condition for obtaining favorable decisions from
a government perceived as the political adversary. Some aggregations of interests
among business leaders emerged throughout the decade, contributing to the idea of
business as a monolithic block without inherent differences—as in the case of the
G17 (1987), the G11 (1985), and the G8 (1987). These groupings, composed of multiple
sector associations, sought to ﬁnd a uniﬁed position vis-à-vis the state.
Ideological positions also played an important role in deﬁning business preferences
regarding the reforms, and contributed to the vagueness which the reforms acquired in
Argentina. To this extent, the existence of a set of economists with strong links both to
local businesses and international ﬁnancial organizations was a precondition for
legitimating liberal economic ideas (Babb 2002; Bockman and Eyal 2002).17 In the
16

The new government emphasized the importance of politics over the economy. It also tried to
re-edit a set of policies that the same party applied when it took ofﬁce during the 1960s. This
view on politics and the economy included the aim to subordinate and discipline local
business to the government goals. However, after a decade of economic liberalization, this
new stage of state intervention collided with business’s interests, particularly those of the
most traditional factions. Policies such as price control (as a tool to reduce inﬂation), more
aggressive tax policies (particularly export rights) and the attempt to make decisions showing a greater state autonomy than in the past caused business grouping to mobilize to confront the new administration (Schvarzer and Sidicaro 1987).

17

Working at think tanks such as Fundación Mediterránea, Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos
de Argentina and Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, these economists presented the liberal project as neutral, objective, and the opposite of “populism” (He-
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context of the economic and institutional crises, and given the perception that the
state was not able to control the most important variables, neoliberal ideas made sense
to most Argentine business elites, including the most powerful and entrenched ones.
By the end of the decade these ideas had gained international legitimacy.18 Argentine
economists were in charge of translating global ideologies into the local context. At
the same time they were in charge of counseling both private and public bureaucracies,
offering frameworks for strategic decision-making (Dezalay and Garth 2002; Beltrán
2005).
Given the characteristics of Argentine business and the complexity of the process
through which agreement was reached, the idea of consensus throughout the business
community deserves special scrutiny. What characterized the agreement was the
ambiguity and vagueness of the proposals supported by the business community.
Argentine businesses did agree on a set of basic and unquestionable ideas: state
intervention as the cause of the crisis and inﬂation; the end of the state-based
strategy of development; the need to transform the state by reducing its scope and
functions; the idea of the market as the best way to organize social relations,
distribute resources, and generate proﬁt; and the need to be integrated into the
global economy. Privatization, market deregulation, and (vaguely deﬁned)
liberalization and opening of the economy were signaled as reforms the government
should adopt (Beltrán 2005). However, beyond these common and vaguely deﬁned
sentiments, differences prevailed regarding the best ways to transform these ideas
into actual policies. Using the terminology of Hirschman (1977), the agreement
constituted a “tactical dimension”: a discourse composed of implicit contents never
fully scrutinized. In other word, the speciﬁc steps to be followed, the precise features
of the reforms, and their consequences for each sector were never seriously discussed.
The ambiguity implicit in the consensus is crucial to any explanation of the scope
and shape reforms would take in forthcoming years. In fact, each business sector had
different ideas about what the reforms should imply. The Sociedad Rural Argentina
expected that reforms would take the country back to a “golden age” of the agroexport model of the early 20th century; a reduced public deﬁcit would mean elimination
of taxes (SRA 1987). More pragmatically, and with an eye on ﬁnancial globalization,
the Asociación de Bancos Argentinos sustained the argument that the state should be
reformed in order to eliminate restrictions on the arrival of ﬁnancial capital and
investments—access to global markets would allow the development of a local
ﬁnancial system in the country. For the Unión Industrial Argentina, state transformation
meant an impulse to the beneﬁt of industrial production and manufactured goods
redia 2006). They differentiated themselves from the “old” generation of “liberal” economists
who were part of the traditional elite. Most of them belonged to the middle class and had
PhDs from American or British universities (Babb 2002; Centeno and Silva 1996). They were
highly inﬂuential in introducing neoliberalism into Argentina.
18

Peter Hall (1989:10) argues that “the persuasiveness of a new set of economic ideas […]
depends not simply on the ideas themselves but on the way in which they ﬁt with other existing ideas, including the pertinent array of existing economic theories, recognized puzzles,
and observations of the contemporary economic world.”
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exports. To this group, deﬁcit reduction should be translated into active policies for
industrial development; for them, “a reduction of the restriction on access to
imported goods would be acceptable under certain conditions” that included some
speciﬁc forms of state protection (UIA 1987).
Diverse interpretations of reforms reveal the existence of opposite interests
among business sectors. Such differences were displayed more clearly every time the
government advanced toward concrete political reforms (Beltrán 2007). In the 1980s
internal differences emerged when Alfonsín’s government sought to privatize public
enterprises.19 Yet, despite these contrasting visions, business leaders publicly spoke
with a relatively uniﬁed voice.20
The 1980s ended abruptly. In the middle of a social and institutional crisis and
hounded by hyperinﬂation (3,080 percent by 1989), Alfonsín resigned before the end
of his term after the election was won by the Peronist Carlos Menem (Botto 1999;
Sidicaro 2002). The new government assumed power in 1989 and initiated reforms at
an amazingly fast pace: the most important reforms were impemented in no more
than three years. Support from liberal circles and business was crucial to the adoption
of the reforms.21 Menem assumed that business leaders’ diagnosis was valid and soon
tried to create coalitions in order to assure his government’s continuity.
However, once concrete reforms began, differences arose within business.22 At
this stage it became clear that the consensus generated in the previous years had its
limits. During the ﬁrst years of Menem’s government, these differences were crucial
19

In 1986, and then in 1987, the government tried to privatize important public enterprises,
including communications and airlines. Initiatives failed because local businesses were not
yet interested in participating and because they expected greater participation, as eventually happened in the 1990s.

20

The G8 was the most inﬂuential and lasting of the fourth-degree business groupings. An informal association that groups the eight more important business groupings, it was made up
of the Argentine Industrial Union, the Argentine Rural Society, the Argentine Chamber of
Construction, the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Banks of the Argentine
Republic, the Argentine Banks Association, and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. Formed
in 1987, it wielded great inﬂuence in the last years of the Alfonsín government. In the 1990s
it supported general economic reform. Once the negative effects of the reforms became evident, internal differences emerged.

21

This contrasts with the Chilean experience—a case of early neoliberalization imposed by
force under a dictatorship (Barret 1985)—and with the Brazilian one—a slow and late transformation with some degree of business opposition until the mid-1990s (Diniz 1991; Boschi
1991; Evans 1992; Kingstone 1999).

22

These differences can be deduced not only from discourse but also from statistic evidence.
The Encuesta a Grandes Empresas of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and
various business performance indexes (e.g. those published in Mercado) show far-reaching
economic change in the 1990s. In aggregated terms, the internationalization of the economy
meant that local businesses lost their positions (both economically and politically). This process was uneven, but it was present across all sectors of activity, intensifying the differences.
Regarding the differences among sectors, data from the Ministry of the Economy shows a process of re-primarization of the economy and a development of the ﬁnance sector, accompanied by a decline in the manufacturing industry.
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for the dynamics of the political economy. In contrast to the previous decade, it was
more difﬁcult for business leaders to coordinate their actions. As the government
was introducing policies that were aligned with their demands, it became more and
more difﬁcult for those who were being harmed to ask for a change in political
orientation. Therefore, differences coexisted with a general agreement with the
“orientation” of the new government. For the Argentine Rural Society, for instance,
the ﬁrst economic plan of Menem’s administration included “the most important
aspirations: to reach ﬁscal balance, eliminating the public deﬁcit, in order to stop
inﬂation” (SRA 1989). The industrialists, at the same time, supported the government’s
proposal to “reduce the state, deregulate, free the markets, […] and open up
opportunities for creative private initiative” (UIA 1989).
Menem’s choice for his ﬁrst Minister of the Economy sent a clear, strong signal
to the business community: the position was ﬁlled with a member of the economic
group Bunge & Born, one of the more traditional and powerful Argentine holdings.
The arrival of the new minister was interpreted as an alliance between the government
and the most powerful business sectors, implying that some traditional associations
(e.g. the Unión Industrial Argentina) had been sidelined (Viguera 2000). Therefore,
once “businessmen” were in decision-making positions, it became clear that the
apparent consensus masked different and diverse contents. Initial measures were
aimed at structural adjustment, increasing tariffs, and freezing prices and salaries to
stop inﬂation. However, difﬁculties in controlling inﬂation and conﬂicts with diverse
business sectors led the minister to resign.
Between 1989 and 1991, the implementation of the reforms followed a complex
path of conﬂict and bargaining between the government and different business
sectors. Once reforms were underway, each sector tried to negotiate to improve its
position under the new circumstances. What was now clear was that reforms
discriminated between winners and losers and that the ambiguous consensus of the
previous decade had reached an end. In a scenario where multiple parameters had
been modiﬁed at the same time, many businesses beneﬁted from certain policies but
were harmed by others (Schneider 2005). The opening of the economy, the reduction
of subsidies, the increasing cost of credit, and the change in relative prices had an
asymmetrical impact upon each sector and even within each of those sectors.
Menem’s government alternated attempts at coalition-building with efforts to
impose discipline on business. The rhythm and direction of the reforms was deﬁned
through a complex bargaining process between government and business. Privatization
was crucial to generating support and consensus on the reforms, since it was the main
source of entrepreneurs’ initial gains (Gerchunoff et al. 1992). The reduction of import
barriers, on the other hand, became a focus of criticism. Thus, the vague content of the
reforms helped them to be implemented initially, and the transformations made in this
period had long-term effects both on the economic system and the economic players.
During the ﬁrst year some of those who were being harmed by the new situation became
critical of the policies, but had no capacity to articulate their demands and produce
effective and coordinated political action. This controversial period was soon ended by
the passage of the Convertibility Law in 1991. After that, the reforms initiated in the
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context of the hyperinﬂation crisis were expanded: privatization, deregulation, and the
opening of the economy became more organic and systematic (Toulan and Guillén
1997), creating new conditions for future political activity by business.23 For the
following decade, the business groupings’ capacity to voice their positions, as well as
their political options, were framed by a pro-market view that limited opportunities to
articulate alternatives, particularly for those who were considered the losers of this
process.
EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE

The rationale followed by Argentine business has important points of contact
with the Soviet case, but there are also signiﬁcant differences. While Soviet managers
suspected that reforms would not take deep roots and amount to much change,
Argentine business elites shared a different idea of what “failure” meant. Its meaning
in the late 1980s was connected, ﬁrst of all, with the assumption that the state
interventionist model of development had reached a critical point and that it was
necessary to advance toward a new one. This idea was reinforced by persistent
inﬂation and was conﬁrmed by hyperinﬂation in 1989. The argument was made that
the ISI model had been exhausted since the early 1970s and that state-led
development had failed. What this did not take into account was that the model had
suffered from policies introduced by the military and their minister for the economy,
José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, in the second half of the decade (Basualdo et al. 1990;
Rodrik 1998). Although for some types of business, the model clearly no longer
worked, this was not true for every sector. Based on the perceived failure of ISI, in the
1980s entrepreneurs assumed that the introduction of liberal reforms was the best
option at hand. Although vagueness and ambiguity were key factors, Argentine
business leaders did not act only under unknown conditions; they also calculated
rationally the possible results of reforms and how they would affect them.
The rationale of the expectations of business elites was inﬂuenced by historical
experience and their relations with the state. First, they read accurately that the
state was in a critical economic position. External indebtedness, the lack of
investment, the lack of capacity to collect taxes, and inﬂation had put the state in
a position that constrained its capacity to answer their demands. Business elites
concluded then that the state could not subsidize them as it had done in the past.24
According to this reasoning, structural change meant new opportunities, at least
for some—those with a chance to proﬁt from privatizations.25 This helps understand
23

The program established a ﬁxed exchange rate and limited the Central Bank to acting as
a currency board. Furthermore, the tax system was reformed, introducing a single value-added
tax on all goods and services and making this tax the state’s main source of income. The law
also included a set of measures to ﬁght tax evasion and prohibited contract indexation.

24

At the end of the military government, foreign debt reached $46 billion. Between 1976 and
1983, the debt grew by 364 percent, representing 20 percent of GNP and 160 percent of annual exports (Ministerio de economía (www.mecon.gov.ar); INDEC 1986).

25

During the 1990s, some of the most powerful economic groups participated in privatizations.
In most cases, public enterprises were bought by a consortium composed of international
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the apparent paradox that most businesses that supported reforms and demanded
less state intervention had developed as capitalists under the protection—and
using the subsidies—of the state (Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Durand 1994; Diniz
2000).
There was a second argument that appealed to a wider spectrum of
entrepreneurs: based on history, business elites expected a change in “forms” of
state protection, but not a demise of state protection itself. This turned out to be
correct, but state protection acquired a narrower meaning than business elites
expected. In other words, Argentine business perceived that if things went wrong,
the state would bail them out as it had done before.26 This is the reason why, in
spite of being a heterogeneous ﬁeld, most business sectors visualized themselves
as “winners” of the future transformation: for them, risks would eventually be
reduced by state action.
In fact, Argentine business elites had good reason to believe that the state
would rescue them. First, Argentine capitalism developed through the state.
Subsidization, market protection, and proﬁtable state contracts had been the means
employed by the most powerful businesses to evolve (Azpiazu et al. 1986; Sabato
1988; Schvarzer 1991). Furthermore, the state had emerged from various critical
situations in the past, “saving” business interests: a few years earlier, the state had
nationalized debts which the private sector had acquired from international banks
during the military government.27
For businesses, the probability of state support was higher under liberal
governments than during Keynesian/populist periods. Moving into liberal reforms
promised to put them in a better position for bargaining with the state. In their
reasoning, the more apparently capitalist the model, the more the state would need
to negotiate with owners of capital—and so business elites would have a key role
under the new rules and be in a better position vis-à-vis the state (Viguera 2000,
Kingstone 1999).
It was not until the reforms started to be introduced in the 1990s that the actual
costs of change became apparent. The effects of the reforms, however, were very
different from what some of their supporters had expected. Although some individual
businesses were able to make adjustments to become more competitive, many—
particularly small and medium-size manufacturing ﬁrms—went bankrupt. With the
ﬁrms (with market know-how and technical capacity), a foreign investor (ﬁnancial institutions such as Citi Bank, which held debt bonds that the government accepted at their nominal
value) and local businesses.
26

When the “debt crisis” hit most Latin American countries in the early 1980s, many Argentine
businesses were “saved” by the state. Through different mechanisms, the state assumed debt
taken on by the private sector, which at this point represented almost half of total foreign
debt (Basualdo 1988).

27

Private debt was about 50% of total debt (Basualdo 1988). The military took the place of the
private debtors in negotiations with the international creditors and itself became the creditor to local business. Later, inﬂation considerably reduced private debt, and the process ended through a transfer of debt from private debtors to the state.
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reduction of tariff barriers, powerful competitors entered the market, affecting the
position of even some of the most powerful local grupos (Basualdo 2006; Kosacoff
1998; Schorr 2004; Schvarzer 2001; Rapoport 2005). Increasing competition and
difﬁcult (and expensive) access to credit favored concentration and foreignization of
the economy (Chudnovsky and López 1998; Kosacoff 1998). The lack of state
protection affected all sectors of the economy, including the manufacturing industry,
food producers, and ﬁnance. Both the manufacturing industry and the rural sector
grew less than average during the 1990s, while the service sector grew more than
average (Basualdo 2006). Many industries, including electronics, machinery and
others such as shoes and textiles reduced their production, and a signiﬁcant number
of ﬁrms closed. In this context, the strategy of most industrialists was “defensive”
(Schvarzer 2001; Kosacoff 1998).28
In sum, Argentine business leaders did not necessarily believe that the project
as a whole would fail. What they expected was that the state would not be able to
discipline them. In addition, they expected be able to draw proﬁt from the new
situation and that if, in the end, something went wrong, the state would act in their
interests. From the viewpoint of the Argentine business elites, no matter what the
characteristics of the model were to have been, the theoretical chance to win was
always there.
OPPORTUNITY FOR AUTONOMY

As in the USSR, reforms promised Argentine business elites the possibility to
increase their autonomy from the state. This view was founded on the belief that
under a liberal-oriented government, business leaders would be in a better position
to obtain responses to their demands. However, autonomy had different meanings.
First of all, the Argentine state had left more room for autonomy than had the Soviet
state. Secondly, owners usually have more room to maneuver than managers.
Therefore Argentine owners did not perceive that they were limited in their decisionmaking per se (as managers did). For them, greater autonomy from the state meant
the opportunity to do new and more lucrative business without state control of their
activities and with a chance to reduce tax payments to a minimum.
Therefore, autonomy in Argentina represented an opportunity to reduce
economic regulation. While Soviet managers sought to reduce state regulation of
their activities, in the absence of private property even small steps toward more
autonomy carried greater weight than in Argentina. Here, business shared the
perception that the crisis was caused by state interventionism; deregulation emerged
both as solution for the economy as a whole and an opportunity to increase business
maneuverability and proﬁtability. For the Argentine Construction Chamber (1990),
28

Even big companies were affected differently by the reforms. Basualdo (2006) distinguishes
between those that improved their positions in the 1990s (Pérez Companc, Loma Negra,
SOCMA, Werthein, Acindar, Clarín, Techint), those that disappeared (Bonaﬁde, FV-Canteras
Cerro Negro, Noel, Aceros Bragado, Astilleros Alianza, Scholnik. Celulosa Argentina), and those
that lost ground (Bunge & Born, Bridas, Garovaglio y Zorraquín).
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“the deﬁcit, the overwhelming state, and the budget imbalances formed a scenario
that has brought the country to economic and social chaos.”
History played a key role in the generation of this view: for decades, liberal
business sectors had sustained the notion that state intervention represented the
intrusion of the government into private issues. The critique of interventionism and
the promise of greater autonomy had been discussed within the business ﬁeld for the
greater part of the 20th century. These sectors had enjoyed greater autonomy under
military governments than under democratic ones (Acuña 1995; Birle 1997).
Nevertheless, the dictatorship that began in 1976 and ended in 1983 had changed
the equation: the military closed most channels of communication with civil society,
including business organizations—the Unión Industrial Argentina is a paradigmatic
case. It is fair to say that during this period the state kept a distance from most
businesses, with the exception of some privileged big business groups.29 The military
became “unpredictable” (Acuña 1995).
In addition to the experience of the dictatorship, during the ﬁrst years of the
Alfonsín administration business associations argued that the state left no room for
their initiatives and that retreat from the economy was necessary to free up
investment capacity. The Argentine Industrial Union argued that the most dynamic
private sectors of Argentine society “had suffered excessive extractions and were
affected in their capacity to generate wealth for the economy” (UIA 1986). Ambiguous
neoliberal reforms in Argentina were doubly attractive to the business elite: they
promised increased autonomy vis-à-vis the state and society. This last aspect of
autonomy presents an interesting contrast with the Soviet case. While formal
ideology stressed working-class hegemony through the Communist Party and socialist
state, Soviet trade unions were included in the overall structure of state power and
were not a vehicle for mobilization against managers (Rutland 1990). This would
push Argentine business elites toward neoliberal reform, which was inherently hostile
to organized labor. However, Argentine business elites were not under the same
degree of control as Soviet managers; in this aspect, Soviet managers would be more
attracted to market-style reforms. On balance, however, both factors together led to
a similar outcome: Argentine business elites and Soviet managers accepting some
degree of market-style reform and liberalization.
The state’s retreat from the economy had a series of consequences. The positions
of business elites were reinforced by the conviction that, as in the past, the best
strategy was to “stay inside” the state in order to negotiate speciﬁc policies, rather
than to break relations; open protest was not a good option because it would reduce
the space for bargaining. In fact, the reforms resulted in economic and political
losses. They also implied a change in the system of interest representation that
changed the links between business and the state. The most powerful businessses—
or at least those of them that survived—won autonomy because they were able to
29

A small and select set of economic groups, with informal access to the state and diversiﬁed
investments, had been favored by the military government. Some of them, as we have seen,
proﬁted from the privatizations of the 1990s, while others lost the inﬂuence they had gained
during the previous decade.
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lobby individually with the government. In fact, they won autonomy in a double
sense: from the government and from other companies. However, most companies,
and particularly members of the business associations, did not win autonomy. On the
contrary, once state intervention was reduced, they lost their capacity for negotiation.
In sum, reforms created a new scenario in which the asymmetries produced
fragmentation and differentiation within the business ﬁeld (Schvarzer 2001; Schorr
2004; Sidicaro, 2002). At the same time, as a result of the massive arrival of foreign
investment along with the withdrawal of the state, once the reforms were introduced,
local business had to compete with powerful foreign adversaries supported by their
countries of origin. Therefore, the privileges previously held by powerful Argentine
companies were called into question in a situation of heightened competition.
CONCLUSIONS

The comparison of initial stages of economic reforms in Russia and Argentina
shows how historical and ideological aspects intervened in the decision-making
process of those economic elites who supported the reforms. The comparison shows
that decisions were not based on “inherent” or “natural” characteristics of local
business but conditioned by past experiences and uncertainty regarding the future.
Overall, rationality in managerial and elite decision-making was thus conditioned in
the USSR and Argentina by experiences and expectations established through
stochastic learning in the context of reforms that were sufﬁciently vague and
contingent to allow managers and elites to write a happy future into reforms. The key
factor for understanding their support of the reforms is not their capacity (or lack
thereof) to foresee the future, but the fact that decisions are only intentionally
rational. Limits on rationality are given not only by limited access to information
about the future but also, and more importantly, by the role of ideas and habitus in
the decision-making.
This is not to suggest that we have exhausted the variables and processes at
work in these two cases: further comparative work on internal organizational routines
and organizational ﬁelds would shed more light on why managers and elites chose
the tactics that they did. We suggest that greater attention to Bourdieusian
dynamics—stocks and use of capital (social, economic, political, cultural), ﬁeld
structures and meanings, and content and change in habitus—will add complexity
and reality to the over-simplistic models of organizational behavior, too reliant on
the idea of rational choice, that are at the core of much writing on political economy.
Stochastic learning and anchoring suggest that economic sociologists have been on
the right track, and that policy analysis and policy-making need to make meanings,
experiences, and such learning more central. Ambiguity may be unavoidable, given
the usual politics of reform; but if this is the case, we need to dispel the illusion that
technocratic structures inside the state are the best way to reform, for no matter
what economists may say about the need for particular changes, politics will end up
confusing the reform process. Actors will naturally go with what they know. It may
also be that those engaged in considering reform politics need to keep in mind the
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likelihood of unexpected outcomes and be ready to address them, perhaps through
more business and welfare safety nets or reform timing, sequencing, and duration,
thus allowing for more complicated learning to take place. This was certainly key to
the “gradualism” school of economic reform: give actors time to adjust. Alternatively,
rapid reforms might require the heavy hand of the state to act against actors who did
not choose wisely from the outset; but such “technocratic Stalinism” might have
costs that are ultimately too high, not only in economic but also in human terms.
If this analysis suggests anything, it is that managers and business elites are human,
and so reform will be a messy process; to expect too much rationality might be as
unhelpful as assuming none at all.
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